Rethinking Radical Inclusiveness: A Theoretical Provocation by Mulya, Teguh Wijaya
Anima Indonesian Psychological Journal 
2016, Vol. 31, No. 2, 61-64 
61 
 
Correspondence concerning this editorial article should be addressed to 
Teguh Wijaya Mulya, Faculty of Psychology Universitas Surabaya. Jalan 
Raya Kalirungkut Surabaya 60293. E-mail: teguh @ubaya.ac.id 
 
Editorial 
 
Rethinking Radical Inclusiveness: 
A Theoretical Provocation 
 
Teguh Wijaya Mulya 
Faculty of Psychology 
Universitas Surabaya 
 
The notions of human rights and identity politics have been widely drawn on in the 
contemporary understandings and practices of developing more inclusive cities. Examining 
the UN Habitat III Issue Paper on Inclusive Cities (2015), in this article I attempt to identify 
and problematize some assumptions that might have underpinned our efforts to improve the 
inclusiveness of our cities. I argue that a liberal view of human being has constrained the 
understandings about who “everyone” is, the nature of their sense of self, and what they want; 
which subsequently might exclude and marginalise those who do not fit our conceptions. 
Alternatively, I will draw on poststructuralist theorisation of discourse and subjectivity to 
offer a new way of thinking about human rights and identity politics, and discuss how it might 
contribute to our understanding and practices of inclusiveness. 
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Konsep hak asasi manusia dan politik identitas telah digunakan secara luas dalam pemahaman 
dan praktik kontemporer pengembangan kota inklusif. Dalam artikel ini saya akan mengaji 
dokumen PBB Habitat III tentang kota inklusif dengan tujuan mengidentifikasi dan menyoal 
asumsi-asumsi yang mungkin telah melandasi usaha-usaha untuk menjadikan kota kita lebih 
inklusif. Saya berargumen bahwa pandangan liberal tentang manusia telah membatasi 
pemahaman tentang siapa “semua orang” itu, hakikat pemahaman diri mereka, dan apa yang 
mereka inginkan; sehingga berpotensi mengeksklusi dan meminggirkan mereka yang tidak 
cocok dengan konsepsi tersebut. Sebagai alternatif, saya menggunakan konsep wacana dan 
subjektivitas dari teori pasca-strukturalis untuk menawarkan pandangan baru memahami hak 
asasi manusia dan politik identitas, dan bagaimana pandangan ini dapat berkontribusi bagi 
pemahaman dan praktik keinklusifan kontemporer. 
 
Kata kunci: keinklusifan, kota inklusif, politik identitas, hak asasi manusia, subjektivitas 
 
 
In this editorial article I seek to offer a theoretical 
provocation in relation to the notion of inclusiveness 
and inclusive cities. My discussion here is predicated 
on a premise that an inclusive city starts from in-
clusive ways of thinking, and promoting inclusive 
ways of thinking involves continuous resistance 
towards our current ways of seeing and being in-
clusive. Following this premise, I attempt to identify 
and problematize some assumptions that might have 
underpinned our efforts to build more inclusive cities. 
Specifically, I will draw on poststructuralist con-
ceptualisation of discourse and subjectivity to offer a 
new way of thinking about human rights and identity 
politics, and how it might contribute to our under-
standing and practices of inclusiveness. 
I will start by citing one of the recommendations 
from the UN Habitat III Issue Paper on Inclusive 
Cities (2015, May 31, p. 8): 
Urbanization processes should be more firmly 
entrenched in a human rights framework that en-
sures the alignment of goals and implementation 
processes to specific human rights obligations 
while promoting the accountability of local go-
vernments with respect to evolve from techno-
cratic models to rights-based models that ensure 
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the accountability and responsibility and the 
entitlements of city dwellers as, who are human 
rights-holders (my emphasis). 
This excerpt is an example of how the notion of 
human rights has been central to and frequently 
referred in UN Habitat’s strategies to develop inclu-
sive cities. An inclusive city is understood as a city 
that respects the rights of its dwellers. Underpinning 
this centrality is the liberal construction of human 
being as having universal rights despite their race, 
ethnicity, religion, class, gender, sexuality, and so on; 
that should be protected by the state. As Martha 
Nussbaum (1999, p. 54) has argued that: “… all, just 
by being a human, are of equal dignity and worth, no 
matter where they are situated in society, and that the 
primary source of this worth is a power of moral 
choice within them.” Nussbaum also emphasises 
how this “essence” of being human, that is, the 
ability to make moral choices, must be protected by 
the state:”This [state] treatment [of the people] must 
do two . . . things [:] respect and promote the liberty 
of choice, and ...respect and promote the equal worth 
of persons as choosers” (1999, p. 54). Here, indivi-
duals are constituted as universally equal, able to 
make choices autonomously, and their choices must 
be respected with regards to their basic rights. 
Accordingly, Nussbaum (2011, pp. 33-34) has 
proposed ten qualities that must be there if we are 
going to acknowledge that a given life is human: life, 
bodily health, bodily integrity, senses-imagination-
thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, con-
cerns for other species, play, and control over one’s 
environment. Coming from a country with a number 
of cases of human rights abuses throughout the 
history, I concur with Nussbaum that such respect for 
human dignity through the notion of human rights is 
of paramount importance. 
However, as in any way of understanding human 
nature, this liberal view on human being might not 
always be sufficient to represent all the complexities 
of social reality. The view on human as non-essentialist 
but discursively constituted, for instance, might not be 
completely compatible with this liberal stance. Some 
theoretical traditions, such as poststructuralism, espouse 
the view that there is no objective and universal essence 
of human, but rather, human nature is always consti-
tuted differently in different historical times and 
cultural contexts (Foucault, 1978; Weedon, 1987). 
A first-century Greco-Roman society, for instance, 
might understand the essence of being a human very 
differently from a twenty-first century indigenous 
tribe in rural Indonesia. The way individuals under-
stand themselves, their worlds, and what makes sense 
for them, are both enabled and constrained by dis-
courses available in their specific situation (Weedon, 
1987). Another example is the identity as a gay or a 
lesbian, which is not available prior to the 19th century. 
It is not because there was no same-sex attraction prior 
to that time, but because there were no discourses 
through which people could understand the same-sex 
attraction as an identity (Foucault, 1978). In this way, 
individuals are not essentially autonomous or free to 
make choices. Instead, their ways of being are (re)-
produced by power relations, and choices they made 
are always dependent on the ever-changing discursive 
resources to which they have access. Consequently, 
what we now firmly believe as the essence of being 
human might be very different in the future, or in other 
cultures. 
Following this poststructuralist view on human’s 
understanding of themselves, the claim of universal 
rights based on the “essence” of being human becomes 
problematic. Since there is no such “essence,” a claim 
of universal human rights is understood as a product 
of discursive mechanisms and practices, and thus, is 
open to contestation. As the history has evidenced, the 
notion of human rights is not always universal and 
straightforward, but rather, complex and contested. 
Plummer (2010, p. 47) has stated that “those who 
suggest that [human] rights are straightforward, 
inalienable, and uncontested–and many do–work from 
a shallow and culturally limited ideas of rights.” 
Further, defining what universal human rights are 
implies defining what it means to be human, or in other 
words, to define the nature of humanity (Plummer, 
2010). This is a huge task. It cannot aim for a single 
universal claim, considering the diversity of cultures, 
worldviews, and ways of being – with each of these 
having their own views of humanity. 
One example is the uneasy relationship between 
religion and human rights movement. Based on their 
own views of humanity, most religions in the world 
have certain beliefs or practices that basically violate 
human rights; from killing people in the name of 
God, justifying domestic violence, to condemning 
lesbian and gay sexualities. Unsurprisingly, the World 
Report of Human Rights Watch documented a growing 
conflict between religion and human rights initiatives 
(Nathan, 2009). While certainly there are possibilities 
of integration of religions and human rights–as it has 
been documented in some previous studies (Langan, 
1998; Newlands, 2006; Rehman & Breau, 2007); 
here I draw attention to the possibility that, like 
religions, human rights might not be universal and 
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eternal; rather, it is one among many belief systems, 
with its own views of and ontological assumptions 
about humanity. 
In the same vein, the notion of inclusiveness itself 
might not be self-explanatory, objective, or universal; 
but as a discourse, it is continuously circulating and 
shifting, strengthened and resisted. This post-
structuralist view can be useful to examine and expand 
our understanding and practices of inclusiveness. For 
instance, the UN Habitat III Issue Paper on Inclusive 
Cities (2015, May 31, p. 4) has stated that “effective 
implementation of human rights, equality and non-
discrimination cannot be achieved without the pro-
active involvement of local and subnational govern-
ments.” While I agree with and support this statement, 
we might also need to consider that not all governments 
have agreed and supported the aspiration of inclu-
siveness as the common good. Thus, circulating 
inclusiveness through certain ways of thinking that 
make sense for those governments, such as through a 
discourse of democracy, might add more values in 
building more inclusive cities. 
Another limitation of the concept of inclusiveness 
based on human rights can be found in its reliance on 
the notion of identity. Identity is often seen as relatively 
fixed, categorical, and attached to one’s sense of self. 
Being a woman, for instance, is often viewed as an 
essential identity someone has from birth. In contrast, 
poststructuralism understands subjectivity–that is, 
one’s sense of self–as multiple, contradictory, and 
continuously reworked (Weedon, 1987). There is no 
fixed or essentialist identity attached to oneself. As 
Simone de Beauvoir has famously said, one is not 
born a woman, but rather becomes a woman – and 
what it means to be a woman is always different 
throughout the history, discursively constituted, and 
open to negotiations. 
It is quite different from the meanings circulated 
through the discourse of human rights, which often 
rely on the mechanisms of identity politics, where 
relatively stable “identities” must be specifically 
defined–such as Black, woman, gay, or disabled–
before they can be recognised, and then protected. 
Consequently, inclusiveness based on the concept of 
human rights might only apply to those who are 
willing to be defined by these categories (Kollman & 
Waites, 2009; Stychin, 1995). Someone who refuses 
to identify, specify, or label their gender, for instance, 
cannot be recognised and thus cannot be included 
and protected. To access disability or mental health 
services and benefits, one must take up the “disabled” 
or “mentally ill” subject positions and be defined 
according to the dominant meanings around those 
labels. 
The UN Habitat III Issue Paper on Inclusive Cities 
(2015, May 31, pp. 5-6) has proposed some strategies 
towards inclusive cities; I argue that some of them 
might have relied on identification and specification 
of marginalised groups and identities: 
Supporting excluded urban groups to share their 
views and represent their own needs: An essential 
aspect of ensuring inclusion and meaningful 
participation by all is through the mobilization of 
excluded groups themselves, whose ability to 
engage with more powerful stakeholders is greatly 
enhanced through collective action (my emphasis). 
It is essential to assess the way these services are 
accessible and utilized according to the different 
needs of other marginalized groups, such as 
indigenous peoples, migrants, ethno-cultural 
specificities of communities, women with dis-
abilities, adolescent girls, older persons and 
others in the decision making processes related to 
urban planning (my emphasis). 
While I believe these strategies are considerably 
important in democratising city planning and pro-
moting more inclusive cities–and thus must be 
carried out immediately–they might also be limited 
in the way they position these marginalised groups as 
identifiable, specifiable, have similar characteristics 
(perhaps even unified), and able to straightforwardly 
voice their needs. My own ethnicity, for example, is 
much more complex and contradictory than a simple 
label of “Chinese Indonesian.” As the third gene-
ration of Chinese in Indonesia, my physicality still 
expresses my Chinese-ness. However, since my 
parents’ early conversion to Christianity, my family 
has lost most of our Chinese cultural traditions. 
Unlike my Chinese Indonesian friends from outside 
Java, I do not speak Chinese at all. Lacking in 
curiosity about my Chinese heritage, I found a sense 
of connectedness and fascination with my local 
Indonesian Javanese culture. From this uncertain and 
complicated position, how can I voice what Chinese 
Indonesians as an ethnic group need or want? 
Considering this limitation of identity politics, I 
propose that working towards more inclusive cities 
might need to involve some contradictory moves. On 
the one hand, in our attempt to include everyone we 
need to identify and specify marginalised groups, 
listen to their voices and accommodate their needs. 
On the other hand, we need to be critical of the 
messages or discursive positioning that we reproduce 
through such efforts, which in return, might further 
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constrain these groups’ possibility to see themselves 
differently. In describing poor migrant women, for 
example, have we overly and merely represented them 
as low-skilled, underpaid, abused, unable to access 
basic services, lack of decision making opportu-
nities, and exposed to pollution, crime, and environ-
mental threats? In engaging with young people, have 
we continuously positioned them as unproductive, 
are fuelled by their raging hormones, not knowing 
what to do with their live, full of potentials-but unless 
we facilitate them-they cannot lead healthy and 
productive lives? The challenge is to find the balance 
between recognising both their vulnerability and 
capability, and acknowledging their agency without 
relinquishing our responsibility. 
Finally, understanding inclusiveness as a discourse 
also requires continuous contestations of our current 
ways of seeing inclusiveness and inclusive practices 
– that our inclusiveness is always partial, incomplete, 
and in constant need to be expanded, challenged, and 
problematized. In our discussions on gender, for 
example, have we recognised and included trans-
gendered people, not just men and women? When 
planning a more inclusive city, do we limit inclu-
siveness to humans and ignore other animals which 
should also have the right to live together harmoniously 
in our cities? And if we really pursue radical inclu-
siveness, what about mysterious forces that our scientific 
methodology has not been able to understand, but 
keep demonstrating their existence, subtly and si-
lently? Will we humbly acknowledge and try to in-
clude them in our design of an inclusive city? 
To conclude, in this editorial article I have offered 
a provocation regarding how–in our attempts to be 
inclusive–we might have relied on certain problema-
tic assumptions about who “everyone” is, the nature 
of their sense of self, and what they want – which in 
turn, might have excluded and marginalised those 
who do not fit our conceptions. As a theoretical pro-
vocation, in this article I will not provide any prac-
tical recommendation, only an invitation to keep re-
flexively problematizing our understandings, prac-
tices, and assumptions about inclusiveness. However, 
an example of the embodiment of such invitation can 
be found in the UN Habitat III Issue Paper itself 
(2015, May 31, p. 5). Addressing strategies to be more 
inclusive with migrants, it recommends: 
This includes promoting a more balanced approach 
to the perception of migrants: is essential to im-
prove the current migration “narrative”, which is 
essentially negative, to more accurately reflect 
contemporary migration realities; and the histo-
rically positive impact of human mobility on our 
societies, many of which have been built with the 
contributions made by migrants. 
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